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ABSTRACT. Important decisions are likely made by groups of agents. Thus
group decision making is very common in practice. Very transparent group ag-
gregating rules are given by weighted voting, where each agent is assigned a
weight. Here a proposal is accepted if the sum of the weights of the support-
ing agents meets or exceeds a given quota. We study a more general class of
binary voting systems – complete simple games – and propose an algorithm to
determine which sub classes, parameterized by the agent’s type composition, are
weighted.
Keywords: Complete Simple Games, Weighted Games, Voting, Group Decision
Making.
Copyright: The present paper will be presented and published in a slightly dif-
ferent form at ICORES 2014, http://www.icores.org.
1. INTRODUCTION
Weighted voting is a method for group decision making. For simplicity, we assume
that for each proposal on a certain issue the group members, called agents for
brevity, options are either to vote “yes” or “no”. The aggregated group decision
then is also either “yes” or “no”. Those procedures are called binary voting systems
or games in the literature. The special case of a weighted game consists of a quota
q > 0 and weights wi ≥ 0 for every participating agent. With this, the aggregated
group decision is “yes” if and only if the summed weights of the supporters of a
given proposal meets or exceeds the quota. For n agents, such a game is denoted
by [q;w1, . . . ,wn].
Weighted voting systems are commonly applied whenever not all agents are con-
sidered to be equal. Reasons may lie in heterogeneous competencies for different
issues, see e.g. (Grofman et al., 1983). In stock corporations, weights can arise as
the number of shares that each shareholder owns, see e.g. (Leech, 2013). In two-
tier voting systems like the US Electoral College or the EU Council of Ministers,
agents vote as a block or represent countries with different population sizes, which
then have to be mapped to appropriate weights, see e.g. (Maaser and Napel, 2007).
Weighted games form a very concrete, compact, and well-studied sub class of
group decision rules. Nevertheless, some practical decision rules of legislative
bodies do not correspond to weighted games, like e.g. the present rule of the EU
Council of Ministers. In Section 2, we introduce and motivate the important super
class of complete simple games. So some complete simple games are weighted
and others are not.
In principle, complete simple games (or simple games) can be very complicated.
Restricting to the subclass of symmetric (complete) simple games, where all agents
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have equal capabilities, simplifies things dramatically, as first found out in (May,
1952): All such games1 are weighted, i.e., have a relatively simple structure.
In this paper we aim to generalize May’s Theorem by providing a strategy to
classify all classes of complete simple games, according to the agent’s type com-
position (see Definition 5), with the property that every class member is weighted.
It will turn out that this can happen only if at most five different types of agents are
present and from all but one type there have to be very few agents, see lemmas 4
and 5.
Exact formulas for the number of sub classes of weighted games are rather rare.
From May’s Theorem, one can conclude that the number of weighted games with
n agents all of the same type2 is given by n. In (Kurz and Tautenhahn, 2013),
the authors have presented an algorithm that can compute an exact enumeration
formula for complete simple games with t types of agents and r, so-called, shift-
minimal winning vectors depending on the number of agents n. No such algorithm
is known for weighted games. Having our classification result at hand, we can
enumerate the corresponding sub classes of weighted games since it will turn out,
that in each case the number of occurring shift-minimal winning vectors is bounded
by a small integer and the restrictions from the agent’s type composition can be
easily incorporated into the enumeration algorithm.
2. COMPLETE SIMPLE GAMES
A binary voting procedure can be modeled as a function v : 2N → {0,1} mapping
the coalition S of supporting agents to the aggregated group decision v(S), where
N = {1, . . . ,n} and 2N denotes the set of subsets of N. Quite naturally, several
assumptions of a binary voting procedure are taken for granted:
(1) if no agent’s supports the proposal, reject it;
(2) if all agent’s supports the proposal, accept it;
(3) if the supporting clique of agents is enlarged by some additional agents,
the group decision should not change from acceptance to rejection.
More formally, we state:
Definition 1. A pair (v,N) is called simple game if N is a finite set, v : 2N→{0,1}
satisfies v( /0) = 0, v(N) = 1, and v(S)≤ v(T ) for all S⊆ T ⊆ N.
A more demanding assumption is to require that the agents are linearly ordered
according to their capabilities to influence the final group decision. This can be
formalized with the desirability relation introduced in (Isbell, 1956).
Definition 2. Let (v,N) be a simple game. We write iA j (or j @ i) for two agents
i, j ∈ N if we have v
(
{i}∪S\{ j}
)
≥ v(S) for all { j} ⊆ S ⊆ N\{i} and we abbre-
viate iA j, j A i by i j.
The relation  partitions the set of agents N into equivalence classes N1, . . . ,Nt .
Example 1. For the weighted game [4;5,4,2,2,0] we have N1 = {1,2}, N2 =
{3,4}, and N3 = {5}.
1More precisely, May’s Theorem applies to (complete) simple games with one type of agents (see
Section 2).
2They all have the form [q;1, . . . ,1] with q ∈ {1, . . . ,n}.
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Agents having the same weight are contained in the same equivalence class,
while the converse is not necessarily true. But there always exists a different
weighted representation of the same game such that the agents of each equivalence
class have the same weight. For Example 1, such a representation is e.g. given by
[2;2,2,1,1,0].
Definition 3. A simple game (v,N) is called complete if the binary relation A is a
total preorder, i.e.,
(1) iA i for all i ∈ N,
(2) iA j or j A i for all i, j ∈ N, and
(3) iA j, j A h implies iA h for all i, j,h ∈ N.
All weighted games are obviously simple and complete.
Definition 4. For a simple game (v,N) a coalition S⊆N is called winning if v(S)=
1 and losing otherwise. If v(S) = 1, v(T ) = 0 for all T ( S, then S is called minimal
winning. A coalition with v(S) = 0, v(T ) = 1 for all S ( T ⊆ N is called maximal
losing.
In Example 1, coalition {2,3} is winning, {2} is minimal winning, {3} is losing,
and {3,5} is maximal losing.
Definition 5. For a complete simple game (v,N), the vector (n1, . . . ,nt) ∈ Nt>0,
where ni = |Ni|, is called type composition. The number t of equivalence classes is
called number of types (of agents).
The type composition of Example 1 is given by
(
2,2,1
)
consisting of three
types. Agents within the same equivalence class are interchangeable, i.e., since
coalition {2,3} is winning also the coalitions {1,3}, {1,4}, and {2,4} have to be
winning. The combinatorial explosion of the set of corresponding winning coali-
tions can be partially captured by:
Definition 6. Let (v,N) be a complete simple game with type composition (n1, . . . ,nt).
Each vector s= (s1, . . . ,st)∈Nt with 0≤ si ≤ ni for all 1≤ i≤ t is called coalition
vector of (v,N). Coalition vector s is winning if we have v(S) = 1 for coalitions
S⊆ N with |S∩Ni|= si for all 1≤ i≤ t, and losing otherwise.
The just mentioned four winning coalitions can be condensed to the winning
vector (1,1,0).
Definition 7. For two vectors a = (a1, . . . ,at) ∈ Nt and b = (b1, . . . ,bt) ∈ Nt we
write a≤ b if ai ≤ bi for all 1≤ i≤ t.
If a is a winning vector of a complete simple game and a≤ b, then b is winning
too. Next, we define a tightening of the concept of minimal winning and maximal
losing coalitions for coalition vectors. To this end we have to assume 1A 2A · · ·A
n in the following.
Definition 8. For two vectors a = (a1, . . . ,at) ∈ Nt and b = (b1, . . . ,bt) ∈ Nt we
write a  b if ∑ij=1 a j ≤ ∑ij=1 b j for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t. Vector a is called shift-minimal
winning (SMW), if a is winning and all b  a, with b 6= a, are losing. Similarly,
vector a is called shift-maximal losing (SML), if a is losing and all b  a, with
b 6= a, are winning.
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An example is given by (0,1,0)  (1,0,0). The SMW vectors of Example 1
are given by (1,0,0) and (0,2,0). The unique SML vector is given by (0,1,1).
We remark that each complete simple game is uniquely characterized by its type
composition and its full list of SMW vectors. Of course, not every collection of
coalition vectors for a given type composition is a feasible set of SMW vectors.
Definition 9. Let a= (a1, . . . ,at)∈Nt and b= (b1, . . . ,bt)∈Nt be two vectors. We
write a ./ b if neither a b nor a b, i.e., when they are incomparable. Mimicking
the lexicographic order, we write am b if there exists an index k ∈ {0, . . . ,n− 1}
such that a j = b j for all 1≤ j ≤ k and a j+1 > b j+1.
A parameterization theorem for complete simple games with t types of agents
has been given in (Carreras and Freixas, 1996):
Theorem 1.
(a) Let vector n̂ = (n1, . . . ,nt) ∈ Nt>0 and a matrix
S =

s1,1 s1,2 . . . s1,t
s2,1 s2,2 . . . s2,t
...
. . . . . .
...
sr,1 sr,2 . . . sr,t
=

ŝ1
ŝ2
...
ŝr

satisfy the following properties:
(i) 0≤ si, j ≤ n j, si, j ∈ N for 1≤ i≤ r, 1≤ j ≤ t,
(ii) ŝi ./ ŝ j for all 1≤ i < j ≤ r,
(iii) for each 1 ≤ j < t there is at least one row-index i such that si, j > 0,
si, j+1 < n j+1 if t > 1 and s1,1 > 0 if t = 1, and
(iv) ŝim ŝi+1 for 1≤ i < r.
Then, there exists a complete simple game (v,N) associated to (n̂,S).
(b) Two complete simple games (n̂1,S1) and (n̂2,S2) are isomorphic if and only
if n̂1 = n̂2 and S1 = S2.
Besides being rather technical, there is some easy interpretation for the stated
conditions. Condition (i) simply states that the ŝi are feasible with respect to the
type composition n̂. If we would not have ŝi ./ ŝ j, then either ŝi  ŝ j or ŝi  ŝ j,
so that one of both vectors can not be shift-minimal. Condition (iii) is necessary
to enforce equivalence classes according to n̂ and condition (iv) prevents from row
permutations. We call two complete simple games isomorphic if there exists a
bijection for the respective agent’s names preserving winning and losing coalitions.
Definition 10. A simple game (v,N) is called weighted if and only if there exist
weights wi ∈ R≥0, for all i ∈ N, and a quota q ∈ R>0 such that v(S) = 1 is equiva-
lent to ∑i∈S wi ≥ q for all S⊆ N.
3. (NON-) WEIGHTEDNESS
We have mentioned in the introduction that some complete simple games are weighted
while others are not. In this section, we want to provide a method to decide which
case occurs3.
3Several algorithms to decide whether a given simple game is weighted or not are known in the
literature, see e.g. (Taylor and Zwicker, 1999) for an overview.
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Example 2. Let n̂= (2,4) and S =
(
2 0
0 4
)
, then the complete simple game (n̂,S)
is not weighted.
Similar to the matrix S of the shift-minimal vectors, one can write down a matrix
L of the shift-maximal losing vectors. If running time is not an issue, this can be
easily done algorithmically:
For each coalition vector a=(a_1,...a_t)
determine whether a is winning or losing
End
For each losing vector a=(a_1,...a_t)
ok=True
For i from 1 to t
If a_i<n_i and a+e_i is losing
Then ok=False
End
If ok==True Then output a
End
Here ei denotes the ith unit vector and we have L =
(
1 2
)
in Example 2.
Lemma 1. For a complete simple game (v,N) let S˜ be a matrix of (some) winning
vectors and L˜ be a matrix of (some) losing vectors. If there exist (row) vectors x,y
with non-negative real entries, ‖x‖1 = ‖y‖1 > 0 and xS˜ ≤ yL˜, then (v,N) can not
be weighted.
Proof. Combining the fact that the weight of each winning coalition is larger than
the weight of each losing coalitions with the weighting of coalitions induced by x
and y gives a contradiction. 
A well known fact from the literature is the inverse statement, i.e., for each
non-weighted (complete) simple game there exists a set of winning coalitions (or
winning vectors) and a set of losing coalitions (or losing vectors) with multipliers
x,y certifying non-weightedness. The underlying concepts are trading transforms,
see (Taylor and Zwicker, 1999), or dual multipliers in the theory of linear program-
ming. An example of a non-weighted complete simple game can be extended to
other type compositions:
Lemma 2. Let G1 = (v,N) be a complete simple game with type composition n̂ =
(n1, . . . ,nt) and S˜ a matrix of winning vectors, L˜ a matrix of losing vectors, and x,y
be vectors according to Lemma 1, which certify non-weightedness of (v,N). For
each vector m̂≥ n̂ there exists a non-weighted complete simple game G2 = (v′,N′)
with type composition m̂.
Proof. We choose N′ such that N ⊆ N′ and set v′(S) = v(S) for all S ⊆ N, i.e.,
winning vectors of G1 are also winning in G2 and losing vectors of G1 are also
losing in G2. All coalition vectors of G2 that are comparable to the already assigned
vectors, i.e., to the coalition vectors of G1, are accordingly set to be either winning
or losing. For the remaining vectors we have some freedom, but for simplicity
determine them to be losing vectors. We can easily check that G2 is completely
characterized and is indeed a complete simple game. Since the rows of S˜ are also
winning vectors in G2 and the rows of L are also losing vectors in G2, we can apply
Lemma 1 with the original vectors x,y to deduce that G2 is non-weighted. 
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As an example, let (v,N) be uniquely characterized by n̂ = (3,4) and S =(
2 2
)
. The matrix of shift-maximal losing vectors is given by L =
(
3 0
1 4
)
and
we have x= (2), y= (1,1) as a certificate for non-weightedness. For m̂= (6,6) the
construction of Lemma 2 gives the game with type composition m̂ and S =
(
2 2
)
.
Now the matrix of shift-maximal losing vectors is given by L =
(
3 1 0
0 4 6
)T
.
From the reused vectors x, y we can conclude the non-weightedness of the larger
complete simple game. The degree of freedom in the proof of Lemma 2 allows
us to also conclude that the complete game given by type composition m̂ and
S =
(
2 2
0 6
)
is also non-weighted. Here we have L =
(
3 0
1 4
)
. The common
parts S˜ and L˜ have to be chosen accordingly.
Definition 11. We call a type composition n̂ = (n1, . . . ,nt) weighted if all com-
plete simple games, given by a matrix S of its SMW vectors and n̂, are weighted.
Otherwise we call n̂ non-weighted.
Since (3,4)≥ (2,4) we do not learn anything new, i.e., Lemma 2 alone is suffi-
cient to prove:
Lemma 3. Each type composition n̂ = (n1,n2) with n1 ≥ 2 and n2 ≥ 4 is non-
weighted
Lemma 4. Each type composition n̂=(n1, . . . ,nt)∈Nt>0 with t ≥ 6 is non-weighted.
Proof. The game (m̂,S) with
S =

1 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 1 1 0
0 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 1

is complete, non-weighted, and has m̂ = (1,1,1,1,1,1) as its type composition
with 6 types. For t > 6 we consider the complete simple non-weighted game with
type composition with m̂ = (1, . . . ,1) ∈ Nt>0 uniquely characterized by its matrix
S =

1 1 0 0 0 0 | 1 0 1 0 . . .
1 0 1 0 0 1 | 0 1 0 1 . . .
1 0 0 1 1 0 | 1 0 1 0 . . .
0 1 1 1 0 0 | 0 1 0 1 . . .
0 0 1 1 1 1 | 1 0 1 0 . . .

of SMW vectors. Lemma 2 transfers the result to arbitrary type compositions n̂
with t ≥ 6 types. 
With the help of lemmas 2 and 4, we can propose the following strategy to clas-
sify all weighted type compositions n̂. For small n, determine all complete simple
games with at most 5 types of agents and determine which ones are weighted or
non-weighted. Taking only the smallest examples, we obtain a generalized ver-
sion of Lemma 3 and may hope that all other cases correspond to weighted type
compositions. Doing that we obtain:
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Lemma 5. For each type composition n̂=(2,4), (2,2,2),(1,1,5),(1,2,3),(1,3,2),
(2,1,4),(2,4,1),(1,1,1,3),(1,1,3,1),(2,1,2,1),(2,3,1,1),(1,2,2,1),(1,2,1,2),
(1,1,2,2),(1,2,1,1,1),(1,1,2,1,1), (1,1,1,2,1),(1,1,1,1,2) there exists a non-
weighted complete simple game attaining n̂.
Conjecture 1. Each type composition n̂ is either weighted or there exists a type
composition m̂, contained in the list of Lemma 5, with n̂≥ m̂.
In the next section, we propose an algorithmic approach to prove Conjecture 1.
As an example, we prove some special cases in Subsection 4.5.
4. WEIGHTED TYPE COMPOSITIONS
Due to Lemma 3, for t = 2 types of agents, the only possible candidates for
weighted type compositions are of the form (1,?), (?,1), (?,2), and (?,3), where
? stands for an arbitrary positive integer.
Definition 12. A setω= (n1, . . . ,ni−1,?,ni+1, . . . ,nt) of type compositions is called
i? family with t types. We call ω weighted if all of its elements are weighted.
Corollary 1. (of Conjecture 1) (?), (1,?), (?,1), (?,2), (?,3), (?,1,1), (?,1,2),
(?,1,3), (?,2,1), (?,3,1), (1,?,1), (1,1,4), (1,2,2), (?,1,1,1), (?,1,1,2), (?,2,1,1),
(1,?,1,1), (1,1,2,1), and (?,1,1,1,1) are weighted.
In this section, we propose an algorithm capable to prove that the type compo-
sitions of a given i? family ω with t types are weighted (if true).
4.1. Step 1: SMW Vectors. Consider a complete simple game with type com-
position n̂ ∈ ω and matrix S of its SMW vectors. We aim to write down a finite
set of parameterized candidates for the rows of S only depending on ω. With α={
a = (a1, . . . ,ai−1) | 0≤ a j ≤ n j, 1≤ j ≤ i−1
}
we introduce the injective func-
tion τ : α→ N by τ(a) = ∑i−1j=1 ai∏i−1k= j+1(nk + 1), i.e., we are just numbering the
elements of α in a convenient way. Additionally we set τ(ω) := τ
(
(n1, . . . ,ni−1)
)
+
1 = |α|.
Lemma 6. Given an i? family ω with t types let C(ω)
=
{(
a,mτ(a)− c,b
) | a ∈ α,b ∈ β,c ∈ N,c≤ Λ} ,
where β =
{
(bi+1, . . . ,bn) ∈ Nn−i | bh ≤ nh
}
, Λ = ∑nh=i+1 nh, and the m j are free
variables. For each simple game with type composition n̂ ∈ ω and matrix S =
(s˜1, . . . , s˜r)T of its SMW vectors, there exists an allocation of the m j, such that
s˜h ∈C(ω) for all 1≤ h≤ r.
Proof. Given a complete simple game with type composition n̂ ∈ ω and matrix
S = (s˜1, . . . , s˜r)T of its SMW vectors. For each a ∈ α let t˜a = (a,m,b), where
b = (bi+1, . . . ,bn) ∈ β, the row-vector of S whose first i− 1 coordinates coincide
with a and whose ith coordinate m ∈ N is maximal. If t˜a exists, we set mτ(a) = m
and mτ(a) = −1 otherwise. Now let s˜ j = (a,m′,b′) be an arbitrary SMW vector
whose first i− 1 components coincide with a. Clearly m′ ∈ N, m′ ≤ m, and b′ =
(b′i+1, . . . ,b
′
n) ∈ β. If m′ < m then there exists an index k ∈ {i+ 1, . . . ,n} with
m′ +∑kh=i+1 b′h > m+∑
k
h=i+1 bh since ∑
i−1
h=1 ah +m
′ < ∑i−1h=1 ah +m and t˜a ./ s˜ j.
With ∑kh=i+1 bh ≥ 0 and ∑kh=i+1 b′h ≤ ∑nh=i+1 nh we have m′ > n−Λ. 
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Thus we can parameterize the potential SMW vectors of a complete simple game
attaining ω using at most τ(ω) parameters as elements in C(ω), where
|C(ω)| ≤
(
n
∑
j=1, j 6=i
n j
)
·
n
∏
j=1, j 6=i
(n j +1), (1)
i.e., the number rows r is bounded by ω.
4.2. Step 2: Matrices of All Shift-minimal Winning Vectors. Given an i? fam-
ily ω with t types, the sets of SMW vectors of a complete simple game with type
composition n̂ ∈ ω are subsets of C(ω). Thus, we can loop over all elements of
2C(ω) and need to check whether the selected subsets satisfy the conditions of The-
orem 1(a). The technical difficulty we have to face here is, that the entries can
linearly depend on the parameters m j. In (Kurz and Tautenhahn, 2013) the similar
situation, where all entries si, j are parameters, has been treated. There it is shown
that all feasible cases, meeting the conditions of Theorem 1(a), can be formulated
as a union of systems of linear inequality systems in terms of the parameters. Ex-
emplarily, condition (a)(ii) is satisfied for a pair of indices 1 ≤ i < j ≤ r, if two
further indices 1≤ h,k ≤ t exist with
h
∑
u=1
si,u+1≤
h
∑
u=1
s j,u and
k
∑
u=1
si,u ≥ 1+
k
∑
u=1
s j,u.
Performing these steps yields a finite list S1,S2, . . . of matrices, whose entries are
linear functions of the parameters m j, such that the rows of each matrix Sh are
the (parametric) SMW vectors of complete simple games with type composition in
ω whenever the parameters mi satisfy the linear constraints of the corresponding
polytope Ph. Moreover, all complete simple games with type composition in ω are
captured by one of the pairs Sh, Ph. (It is indeed possible to obtain a partition of the
desired space.)
4.3. Step 3: Losing Vectors. For simplicity, we assume that we are given a single
pair (Sh,Ph) according to Subsection 4.2. In (Kurz and Tautenhahn, 2013) the para-
metric Barvinok algorithm was applied to count the respective number of complete
simple games. Here we want to study weightedness so that we also need a descrip-
tion (not necessarily the most compact description) of the set of losing vectors. To
this end, we mention that the SML vectors of a complete simple game are either
incomparable to all SMW vectors, and so contained in C(ω), or arise as so-called
shifts of one of the SMW vectors, i.e., special vectors that have a fairly small ‖·‖1-
distance to one of the SMW vectors. Due to space limitations we just mention, that
it is possible to exactly describe a set of all candidates for SML vectors, similar as
C(ω) for the set of SMW vectors. Then we can again consider subsets of the set
of candidates and have to check that the implications, with respect to be a winning
or a losing vector, are non-contradicting and that the state of each vector can be
deduced in any case. If properly implemented with all technical details, things boil
down to a splitting of a sub case (Sh,Ph) into a finite list of sub sub cases
(Sh,Lh,1,Ph,1) ,(Sh,Lh,2,Ph,2) , . . . ,
where the rows of the Lh, j correspond to (not necessarily shift-maximal) losing
vectors and the Ph, j are sub polytopes of Ph.
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4.4. Step 4: Weighted Representation. For simplicity, we assume that we are
given a single triple Γ=
(
Sh,Lh,Ph
)
according to Subsection 4.3. For each integral
choice of the parameters m j in Ph, we have a unique complete simple game at
hand and can check whether it is weighted with the help of a linear program, see
e.g. (Taylor and Zwicker, 1999). If at least one of such games is non-weighted,
then we can use the methods of Section 3 to deduce that a certain class of type
compositions is non-weighted. So let us assume that all games corresponding to Γ
are indeed weighted.
Thus, for each (of the possibly infinitely many) complete simple games cor-
responding to Γ, there exist feasible weights obtained at a basis solution of the
corresponding linear program, which is uniquely determined by Γ but depends on
the parameters mi. Nevertheless, the number of possible basis solutions is finite.
Thus, we can loop over all possible parametric basis solutions δ j and determine the
corresponding list of polytopes Ph,k, such that δ j yields a feasible weighting of the
complete simple games corresponding to Sh,Lh whenever the parameters ml are in
Ph,k. If ∪kPh,k = Ph, then ω is weighted for sub case Γ.
4.5. Examples. In the previous four subsections we have sketched an algorithm
that is capable to prove that a given i? family ω with t types is weighted (if the
statement is indeed true). Due to space limitations, we have not given all technical,
sometimes non-trivially, details. Instead, we want to give examples for special
cases.
Lemma 7. ω= (?) is weighted.
Proof. According to Step 1 we have τ(ω) = 1 parameter m0, Λ = 0, and C(ω) =
{(m0)} with |C(ω)|= 1. Since each complete simple game consists of a least one
shift-minimal winning coalition we obtain the one-element list
(
S1 = (m0),P1 =
{(m0) ∈ R1 | 1 ≤ m0 ≤ n1}
)
. Since all elements of C(ω) have already been
assigned to be shift-minimal winning, there remains the unique shifted vector
(m0−1) to be losing in Step 3. In Step 4, we can obtain the basis solution q = m0,
w1 = 1, which is feasible for the entire polytope P1. (We only state the weights for
each type of agents, numbered from 1 to t.) 
Lemma 8. ω= (1,?) is weighted.
Proof. According to Step 1 we have τ(ω) = 2 parameters m0,m1, Λ = 0, and
C(ω) = {(0,m0),(1,m1)} with |C(ω)|= 2. In Step 2 we have to consider the three
non-empty subsets of C(ω). For the case S =
(
0 m0
)
we observe that condition
(a)(iii) of Theorem 1 can not be met for any allocation of the parameters m0,m1.
Thus, there remain only two cases with non-empty polytopes for the parameters:
S1 =
(
1 m1
)
,P1 = {(m1) ∈ R | 0≤ m1 ≤ n2−1}
and
S2 =
(
1 m1
0 m0
)
,P2 =

(
m0
m1
)
∈R2 |
m1 ≥ 0
m1+2≤ m0
m0 ≤ n2
 .
In Step 3, each of the two sub cases is split into two sub sub cases Γ1 =(S1,L1,1,P1,1),
Γ2 =(S1,L1,2,P1,2), Γ3 =(S2,L2,1,P2,1), Γ3 =(S2,L2,2,P2,2), withL1,1 =
(
1 m1−1
0 n2
)
,
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L1,2 =
(
0 n2
)
, L2,1 =
(
1 m1−1
0 m0−1
)
, L2,2 =
(
0 m0−1
)
,
P1,1 = {(m1)∈R |m1 ≥ 1}∩P1,
P1,2 = {(m1)∈R |m1 = 0}∩P1,
P2,1 =
{
(m0,m1)∈R2 |m1 ≥ 1
}∩P2,
P2,2 =
{
(m0,m1)∈R2 |m1 = 0
}∩P2.
In Step 4, fortunately, no further splitting is necessary, and we can even condense
sub cases. For Γ1,Γ2 we have the weighted representation [n2 + 1;n2 + 1−m1,1]
and for Γ3,Γ4 we have the weighted representation [m0;m0−m1,1]. 
Using the parametric Barvinok algorithm or elementary summation formulas
with case differentiation, we conclude the well known fact that the number of n-
agent weighted games with type composition (?) is n. Similarly, we conclude, that
the number of n-agent weighted games with type composition (1,?) is given by
n3−n
6
=
n(n−1)(n+1)
6
=
(
n+1
3
)
for all n ∈ N.
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APPENDIX
Non-weighted Examples. In order to prove Lemma 5 it suffices to give a non-
weighted example for each case. Those can easily be found by classifying all
complete simple games with up to 7 agents. That (2,4) is non-weighted has al-
ready been observed in Section 3. For the other type compositions mentioned in
Lemma 5, we provide the following examples:
• n̂ = (2,2,2), S =
2 0 01 2 0
0 2 2
, L˜ = (1 1 1), x = (1,0,1), y = (2).
References 11
• n̂ = (1,1,5), S =
(
1 0 2
0 1 3
)
, L˜ =
(
1 1 0
0 0 5
)
, x = (1,1), y = (1,1).
• n̂ = (1,2,3), S =
(
1 1 0
0 1 3
)
, L˜ =
(
1 0 2
0 2 1
)
, x = (1,1), y = (1,1).
• n̂ = (1,3,2), S =
(
1 0 2
0 3 0
)
, L˜ =
(
1 1 0
0 2 2
)
, x = (1,1), y = (1,1).
• n̂ = (2,1,4), S =
(
1 0 2
0 1 3
)
, L˜ =
(
2 0 0
0 0 4
)
, x = (2,0), y = (1,1).
• n̂ = (2,4,1), S =
(
2 0 1
0 4 0
)
, L˜ =
(
1 2 1
)
, x = (1,1), y = (2).
• n̂ = (1,1,1,3), S =
1 0 0 20 1 1 1
0 1 0 3
, L˜ = (1 1 0 00 0 1 3
)
, x = (1,1,0),
y = (1,1).
• n̂ = (1,1,3,1), S =
(
1 0 1 1
0 1 2 0
)
, L˜ =
(
1 1 0 0
0 0 3 1
)
, x = (1,1), y =
(1,1).
• n̂ = (2,1,2,1), S =
(
1 1 0 1
1 0 2 0
)
, L˜ =
(
2 0 0 0
0 1 2 1
)
, x = (1,1), y =
(1,1).
• n̂ = (2,3,1,1), S =
(
1 1 0 1
0 3 1 0
)
, L˜ =
2 0 0 01 0 1 1
0 3 0 1
. The vectors
x = (3), y = (1,1,1) yield (3,3,0,3) (3,3,1,2), which is generally also
sufficient to conclude non-weightedness, since the coalition vectors can be
shifted accordingly. Here we may consider two times the SMW vector
(1,1,0,1) and one times the shifted winning vector (1,0,1,1) to obtain
(3,3,1,2).
• n̂ = (1,2,2,1), S =
(
1 0 1 1
0 2 1 0
)
, L˜ =
(
1 1 0 0
0 1 2 1
)
, x = (1,1), y =
(1,1).
• n̂ = (1,2,1,2), S =
1 0 0 20 2 1 0
0 2 0 2
, L˜ = (1 1 0 00 1 1 2
)
, x = (1,1,0),
y = (1,1).
• n̂ = (1,1,2,2), S =
(
1 0 0 2
0 1 1 1
)
, L˜ =
1 1 0 00 1 0 2
0 0 2 2
, x = (1,2), y =
(1,1,1).
• n̂ = (1,2,1,1,1), S =

1 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 0
0 2 1 0 0
0 1 1 1 1
, L˜ = (1 0 1 0 10 2 0 1 0)
)
, x =
(1,0,0,1), y = (1,1).
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• n̂ = (1,1,2,1,1), S =

1 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 0
0 1 2 0 0
0 0 2 1 1
, L˜ = (1 0 1 0 10 1 1 1 0
)
, x =
(1,0,0,1), y = (1,1).
• n̂ = (1,1,1,2,1), S =

1 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 2 0
0 0 1 2 1
, L˜ = (0 1 1 1 01 0 0 1 1
)
, x =
(1,0,0,1), y = (1,1).
• n̂ = (1,1,1,1,2), S =

1 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 1 0
0 0 1 1 2
, L˜ = (1 0 0 1 10 1 1 0 1
)
, x =
(1,0,0,1), y = (1,1).
Proofs of some Special Cases of Conjecture 1. For n ≤ 5 agents, all complete
simple games are weighted, so that all type compositions n̂ with ‖n̂‖1 ≤ 5 are
weighted, i.e., (1,2,2) and (1,1,2,1) are weighted. For n = 6 agents, we re-
mark that exactly 1111 of the 1171 complete simple games are weighted, i.e., 60
games are non-weighted. For n ≥ 7 agents, the discrepancy quickly increases.
For n = 7 agents there are 44313 complete simple games, while only 29373 of
them are weighted. For n = 8 agents, the respective counts are given by 16175188
and 2730164. Via exhaustive enumeration one can easily show that (1,1,4) is
weighted. The cases (?) and (?,1) have already been proven in Subsection 4.5.
Lemma 9. ω= (?,1) is weighted.
Proof. According to Step 1 we have τ(ω) = 1 parameter m0, Λ = 1, and C(ω) =
{(m0,0),(m0,1),(m0− 1,0),(m0− 1,1)} with |C(ω)| = 4. For Step 2 we remark
that no pair of elements of C(ω) is incomparable, so that we have r = 1. There
is no need to consider the cases S = (m0 − 1,0) or S = (m0 − 1,1) separately,
since they are captured by the two cases S = (m0,0) and S = (m0,1). Generally,
we can require that for each used parameter m j there is a SMW vector taking the
value m j− 0 at the respective coordinate. Due to condition (a)(iii) of Theorem 1,
S = (m0,1) is not possible. Thus, there remains only one case with non-empty
polytope for the parameter:
S1 =
(
m0 0
)
,P1 = {(m0) ∈ R | 1≤ m0 ≤ n1} .
In Step 3 there remains a single case: Γ1 = (S1,L1,P1) with L =
(
m0−1 0
)
. In
Step 4 we determine the weighted representation [m0;1,0] for Γ1. 
Lemma 10. ω= (?,2) is weighted.
Proof. According to Step 1 we have τ(ω) = 1 parameter m0, Λ = 2, and C(ω) =
{(m0,0),(m0,1),(m0,2),(m0−1,0),(m0−1,1),(m0−1,2),(m0−2,0),(m0−2,1),
(m0−2,2)} with |C(ω)|= 9. As in the proof of Lemma 9, we remark that we can
assume that one of the vectors (m0,0), (m0,1), or (m0,2) has to be chosen as a
SMW vector. Only the first one is incomparable with one of the other vectors of
C(ω). S =
(
m0 2
)
is impossible due to condition (a)(iii) of Theorem 1. Thus
Step 2 yields the cases
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• S1 =
(
m0 0
)
, P1 = {(m0) ∈ R | 1≤ m0 ≤ n1}
• S2 =
(
m0 1
)
, P2 = {(m0) ∈ R | 1≤ m0 ≤ n1}
• S3 =
(
m0 0
m0−1 2
)
, P3 = P2 = P1
No splitting or modification of the Pi is necessary in Step 3, so that Γi = (Si,Li,Pi),
where L1 =
(
m0−1 2
)
, L2 =
(
m0 0
m0−1 2
)
, and L3 =
(
m0−1 1
)
for all 1 ≤
i≤ 3. In Step 4 we determine the weighted representations [m0;1,0] for Γ1, [2m0+
1;2,1] for Γ2, and [2m0;2,1] for Γ3. 
Lemma 11. ω= (?,3) is weighted.
Proof. According to Step 1, we have τ(ω) = 1 parameter m0, Λ = 3, so that
|C(ω)| = 16. As in the two previous proofs, we remark that we can assume that
one of the vectors (m0,0), (m0,1), (m0,2), or (m0,3) has to be chosen as a SMW
vector. Here we can check that at most r = 2 elements of C(ω) can be pairwise
incomparable. Excluding S =
(
m0 3
)
with condition (a)(iii) of Theorem 1, there
remain the following possibilities for r = 1:
• S1 =
(
m0 0
)
, P1 = {(m0) ∈ R | 1≤ m0 ≤ n1}
• S2 =
(
m0 1
)
, P2 = P1
• S3 =
(
m0 2
)
, P3 = P1
For r = 2 we additionally obtain:
• S4 =
(
m0 0
m0−1 2
)
, P4 = P1
• S5 =
(
m0 0
m0−1 3
)
, P5 = P1
• S6 =
(
m0 1
m0−1 3
)
, P6 = P1
• S7 =
(
m0 0
m0−2 3
)
, P7 = [2,n1]
For i ∈ {1,2,5,6,7} no splitting of the Pi is necessary in Step 3, so that Γi =
(Si,Li,Pi), where L1 =
(
m0−1 3
)
, L2 =
(
m0 0
m0−1 3
)
, L5 =
(
m0−1 2
)
, L6 =(
m0 0
m0−1 2
)
, L7 =
(
m0−1 1
)
. For the remaining indices i ∈ {3,4} cases split
up as Γi, j = (Si,Li, j,Pi, j), where
• L3,1 =
(
m0 1
m0−1 3
)
, P3,1 = {n1}
• L3,2 =
(
m0+1 0
m0−1 3
)
, P3,2 = [1,n1−1]
• L4,1 =
(
m0−1 1
)
, P3,1 = {1}
• L4,2 =
(
m0−1 1
m0−2 3
)
, P3,2 = [2,n1]
In Step 4 we obtain the weighted representations
• [m0;1,0] for Γ1
• [3m0+1;3,1] for Γ2
• [3m0+4;3,2] for Γ3,1 and Γ3,2
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• [2m0;2,1] for Γ4,1 and Γ4,2
• [3m0;3,1] for Γ5
• [2m0+1;2,1] for Γ6
• [3m0;3,2] for Γ7

Thus, Conjecture 1 and Corollary 1 are proven for all type compositions with
t types, where either t < 3 or t > 5. For t ∈ {3,4,5}, the necessary case differ-
entiations become more and more complex so that we aim for a computer aided
proof.
Open Problems. Of course, Conjecture 1 has to be proven in the first run. Sev-
eral ways to extend these considerations are imaginable. One can ask for a similar
classification for roughly-weighted games, i.e., for games where the weight of a
winning coalition can equal the weight of another losing coalition, or for complete
simple games of small dimension, i.e., games which can be represented as the inter-
section of a small number of weighted games. A possibly more challenging open
problem is to provide explicit enumeration results for other sub classes of weighted
games, than the ones known in the literature or those that can be concluded from
the line of consideration presented in this paper.
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